Andy Reid's clock management in the Super Bowl left a lot to be desired. AP

It was an embarrassment of riches. So many nice things written. I might occasionally treat these e-mails in cavalier fashion, but believe me, what you write about my work is deeply appreciated. Of course, someday Andrew might admit, "I just didn't have the heart to send him all the rips. Let the poor old bugger enjoy his last days in sunshine." Yes, it is indeed sunny to go through a collection such as the last batch.

And now we get to the dark side. Philly's strange malaise just when energy was most needed. Josh Nall of Oxford, England, wonders exactly what I was wondering, and for this small achievement he is our, gasp, E-mailer of the Week! The question: "Was it Reid's fault for not telling his QB to run a two-minute drill, or was it McNabb's fault for failing to take hold of the game?"

I read the reports of how McNabb was struggling down the stretch, how he was physically wasted, etc. And then a tiny idea started intruding. Is it possible that Reid deliberately took the fall to protect his QB, that he actually wanted things speeded up, but McNabb was just incapable of obliging? What a disturbing thought. It means that people such as your faithful narrator ripped the hell out of the coach for actually showing a certain nobility.

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So I messed around with that idea for a while. If that were the case, why, then, didn't he lift McNabb for Koy Detmer, a far lesser talent, of course, but someone at least capable of getting his team in gear? This idea was suggested by another reader (whose comments I sincerely appreciate), Uriah from Newport, Ky. He mentioned McNabb's "too-tired-to-care performance."

Well, I think it was Reid's screw-up. It began when he butchered the clock right before halftime, and McNabb was still functional at that point. And it was someone's decision, either Reid's or his special team coach's (with his approval) to drop no one back in punt coverage at the end. Never let the ball bounce when you can help it, is what I've always heard.

I think it was a real bad day for the coach, compounded by the miseries his quarterback suffered. How else can you account for McNabb's terrible final series? There have been hints that the QB went into the tank, bigtime, and he has a history of this. I disagree. He's had his bad games, as everyone has, but I don't think he's a choker. I still remember the tremendously courageous performance he put on against the Bucs, when the Eagles beat them in the wild-card playoff a few years ago.

Remember that McNabb had just led his team on a long touchdown march, so he could at least make the plays, albeit too slowly. So that would have kept Reid from lifting him. He probably found out about McNabb's physical problems too late.

Strategy question from Adam of London, Ont. and I'm probably sounding like Johnny One Note here when I again offer thanks for the sentiments. Why the onside kick from the Eagles, when they could have gotten the ball back in much better field position, had they kicked deep and forced a punt? In retrospect, the deeper kick sounds like a better idea, of course. I think that Reid's idea of clock management is a bit skewed.

The Eagles scored with 1:48 left. They got the ball back, after the Patriots punted, at 0:46. Assuming a deep kickoff, and a three-and-out series for New England, they would have had the ball around their own 30. That's not a bad situation, assuming your QB is functional. Three 15-yard completions and you're trying a 43-yard field goal to tie. And I watched David Akers in the warmups booting them from 50-to-55 yards in that direction.

I don't think Reid worked all that out, when he decided to kick onside. I don't think he realized he'd have that kind of a set up, so he took the gamble. And here's another thought, which is just pure conjecture, mind you.

Say the Patriots are back on their own 30 or so, after the kickoff. Do you really think Charlie Weis would run the ball three times, knowing he'd probably have give the ball back to the Eagles in good shape? When you're starting in Philly territory, you can do that, figuring your punter could kill one deep, but I think if he'd been in his own area, he'd have tried at least one pass -- to buy a first down and end the contest.

Tight end Christian Fauria told me after the game, "I was really hoping Tom  would throw me one, a seven-yard hook or something. Wishful thinking, I guess."

Some very deep strategy from Gilbert of L.A., so involved and technical that I just know he's a coach somewhere. Taking your points in order, I agree that McNabb should move around a bit more. As far as the Patriots pinching the DEs and forcing the Philly runs to go wide, I'm not so sure. The DEs for this game, Colvin and McGinest, are not big guys. They'd take themselves out of commision if they pinched too severely, making it too easy for the Eagles' mammoth tackles, Thomas and Runyan, to cave them in.

No, what I saw was the DEs squaring up, with the outside LBs Phifer and Vrabel filling inside them, and then they worked their blitzes and stunts off that. As far as the short dropback for McNabb, well, they tried a few deeper drops and longer routes, and either the rush got to him too quickly or the coverage was too good downfield. Remember that Owens, as well as he played, was not a deep threat. He got his yards on short routes and missed tackles (and one blatant pick I'll talk about later).

Two tights and max protect, running deeper routes off that? Possibly. The Patriots made that pay off against Pittsburgh. I think, though, that the New England zone would have swallowed it up. I do appreciate your ideas, however, and it's fun to talk technical football every now and then.