
The residue of designThree keys to winning in the modern postseasonPosted: Tuesday October 4, 2005 12:23PM; Updated: Tuesday October 4, 2005 1:57PM "Anything can happen in a short series." I'm sick of that phrase. There is no denying its veracity, but how can you refute any statement that is as vague and all-encompassing as a fortune cookie? Every October we stare wide-eyed at the funny bounces and twists of fate that seem to determine the World Series champion, but isn't it better to examine why things happen during a "short" series instead of chalking up the results to randomness? There is luck involved, of course, in who advances and who doesn't, but 35-plus years of LCS and 10 years of Division Series play have taught us a few practical lessons, too. Here are three things a team can do to enhance its chances in the playoffs, listed in order of importance: 1. Only use your best pitchers
During the regular season, managers employ a "winning side" of the bullpen (setup men, closer) to protect a lead or tie game, and a "losing side" (mopup) when the game seems out of reach. During the playoffs, managers who use those "losing side" pitchers don't last very long. In other words, don't manage as if they are regular-season games. They are not. Falling behind by a few runs in the fourth inning of Game 1 doesn't mean it's time to warm up Al Leiter and feed him to the wolves. It means you get your Game 4 starter (Shawn Chacon or Aaron Small) in there to stop the bleeding. Here are a few examples from recent postseasons that illustrate this point: 1999, first round, Game 5, Boston at Cleveland. The Indians had scored eight runs off Red Sox pitchers in the first three innings, but Pedro Martinez came in from the bullpen to blank the Tribe for the final six frames of a Red Sox win. 2001, World Series, Game 7, Yankees at D'backs. It took six games for Arizona manager Bob Brenly to realize he was only going to win games when Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling were on the mound. Trailing by a run late in the eighth inning, Brenly somehow resisted the urge to bring in the shellshocked Byung-Hyun Kim and instead called for the Big Unit to get the last four outs and set up the D'backs' ninth-inning comeback. 2003, NLCS, Game 7, Marlins at Cubs. Three days after throwing a complete-game shutout in Game 5, Josh Beckett came in for the fifth inning and stayed through the eighth, bridging the gap to closer Ugueth Urbina for a Marlins' victory. In fact, Fish manager Jack McKeon put on a clinic on how to use a deep pitching staff. Check out this box score from Game 2 of the Division Series that year against the Giants, when Trader Jack used Game 4 starter Dontrelle Willis as a LOOGY (Left-handed One Out Guy) to get Barry Bonds out in the eighth inning. This doctrine doesn't just apply to bullpen usage; it should influence how a manager sets his rotation, too. Last postseason Astros manager Phil Garner had a 3-2 lead on the Cardinals in the NLCS. Instead of bringing Roger Clemens back for Game 6 on three days rest and, if necessary, Roy Oswalt for Game 7, also on short rest, Garner made the safe play by saving Clemens for Game 7 on full rest. Garner escaped second-guessing by the media but lost the pennant. In retrospect, he might have been better off giving himself two chances to win the one game he needed. Instead, he allowed one of his weaker pitchers (Pete Munro) to take the ball for Game 6, which the Astros lost in 12 innings. 2. Strikeouts are bad, mmmkay
Last October we kept hearing how it's important to have pitchers who "miss bats" because strikeouts keep the opposition from putting the ball in play. The inverse is true as well -- you want hitters who don't strike out. For all of Oakland GM Billy Beane's famous kvetching about how his fancy stats are of little use during the crapshoot postseason, he built a team last winter that is well-suited for postseason play -- A's hitters only struck out 812 times this season, by far the lowest total in the AL. Oakland also featured power in the bullpen (8.10 K/9 IP) and stout glovework (first in defensive efficiency) to go along with its contact-hitting offense. It's too bad a slew of injuries conspired to keep this October-ready team from playing in October. According to this study from The Hardball Times, which analyzed each playoff series from 1995-2003, teams with a decisive advantage in avoiding strikeouts heading into a series went 22-10. The study also shows that aggressiveness on the basepaths is a major plus as well; teams with a major advantage in steals went 21-12. As for how this line of thinking applies to this postseason, the only series that features a major disparity in these categories is the Angels-Yankees matchup. Angels batters struck out 135 fewer times than the Yankees and stole 75 more bases. This bodes well for Anaheim. 3. Use your whole roster
This will forever be known as the "Dave Roberts Principle:" make sure everybody on your postseason roster has an above-average major league skill that may come in handy. Are those guys at the end of your bench just there to take up space, or can they steal a base, lay down a bunt or upgrade your defense late in a game? The irony of this rule is that the Red Sox don't have a Roberts-type player on their bench but the Yankees do (Tony Womack). The Cardinals have the best corps of reserves, with So Taguchi providing speed (11 steals) and defensive versatility and John Rodriguez boasting a .375 OBP. Hector Luna also reached double-digits in steals. The Braves also have a deep roster thanks to their rookie brigade, featuring strong-armed outfielder Ryan Langerhans and longtime infield prospect Wilson Betemit, as well as the underrated first-base platoon of Adam LaRoche (.457 slugging) and Julio Franco (.805 OPS against lefties).
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