At age 38, Mariano Rivera had 39 saves, a 1.40 ERA and 77 strikeouts while walking just six. Jim McIsaac/Getty Images

One of the great things about being a voter on John Dewan's Fielding Bible panel is I get my Bill James Handbook before it is sold into stores. I love getting stuff early. And, more, I love my Bill James Handbook. Every year they add some great new statistic like one that breaks down how managers do their jobs:

Least effective intentional walkers in 2008 (bomb reflects multiple runs scoring after the walk):

1. Ron Washington (Texas), 20 out of 44 bombed (45.4%)

2. Eric Wedge (Cleveland), 11 out of 28 bombed (39.2%)

3. Cito Gaston (Toronto), 6 out of 16 bombed (37.5%)

4. Bud Black (San Diego), 17 out of 61 bombed (27.9%)

5. Joe Maddon (Tampa Bay), 8 out of 29 bombed (27.6%)

6. Dave Trembley (Baltimore), 12 out of 44 bombed (27.2%)

7. Bobby Cox (Atlanta), 20 out of 80 bombed (25%)

The best intentional walker? St. Louis' Tony La Russa, of course. Only one out of 21 bombed.

The book will break down other things, like the best base runners:

The 2008 best baserunners, excluding stolen bases:*

This list would measure going the number of extra bases a runner gets going from first to third on a single (average runner makes it 27% of the time) second to home on a single (average runner makes it about 59% of the time), first to home on a double (average runner makes it 43% of the time) and also takes into account the extra bases picked up on wild pitches, passed balls, balks, sac flies:

1. Matt Holliday, +28

(Holliday was 15 for 26 going first to third which is amazingly good, 17 for 24 going second to home, 5 for 6 scoring on a double from first, and he took 23 bases, which is a lot. True, you could argue that Holliday is helped by the immense size of Coors Field, but really the guy's an excellent baserunner).

2. Curtis Granderson, +27

3. Nate McLouth +27

(The Gold Glove was a farce, but he's a really good ballplayer)

4. Kelly Johnson +26

5. Shin-Soo-Choo, +26

Every year, like I say, they add all sorts of fun new statistical additions to the the handbook. This year, they added a section called "21st Century Bullpen" which breaks down relievers and makes the very logical case that in today's baseball, bullpen pitchers probably should be assigned positions since they do such very, very different jobs. We already have closers, and then we have a vague collection of set-up men, lefty-specialists, long-men, guys who you bring in to get double play grounders, bridges and so on. And we try to judge them all, more or less, on the same outdated statistics like ERA and won-loss record, and this is absurd.

Anyway, Bill has some real ideas about fixing that, and you HAVE to buy the book and read all about it. For today, I'm more concerned with something else Bill and the guys did: They took all the closers and broke up their their save opportunities into three simple categories:

1. Easy Save. This is a save when the first batter faced is not the tying or go-ahead run.

2. Tough save: This is a save when the tying or go ahead run is already on base when you take over.

3. Regular save: Everything else. (To see a sample from this season, click here.)

Simple enough. Here's a little info on each type of save.

1. Easy save: This represents more than half -- 58% to be exact -- of all save opportunities. And last year all relievers were successful on 87% of their easy save opportunities. Remember, that's ALL relievers -- not just specified closers. People who you would describe as closers (pitchers who had more than 10 save opportunities last year) were actually successful about 92% of the time -- or to put it in perspective, more often than almost any NBA player make free throws or field goal kickers make 30-yard field goals. A real closer should not blow easy saves.

2. Tough save: Almost never happens anymore -- except with Mariano Rivera who was five-for-five in tough save opportunities last year.Most managers bring the closer in to start a clean ninth inning, so tough saves only happen about 5% of the time. And relievers finish them off about 22% of the time. Again, full-time closers do considerably better than that -- they close out about 55% of tough saves.

3. Regular save. Most people would call a regular save a "tough" save because, in most cases it would mean starting the ninth inning with just a one-run lead. Regular saves make up 37% of all save opportunities, and all relievers close them out 57% of the time. Real closers finish them off 72.5% of the time -- as they should since, for the most part, real closers get paid more money.

OK, so this is what we're working with. So, naturally, I had to come up with an utterly meaningless formula to determine who is the best closer because, you know, that's what I do. Using the percentages Bill offered, I figured out how many more (or fewer) saves a closer has than a replacement closer. And then, using my utterly inept math skills, I came up with a CLOSER+ number that attempts to tell you how much better a closer is than average. The average, of course, is 100.

Here goes nothing: these were the best closers in 2008 (20 or more save opportunities):

1. Mariano Rivera, Yankees

Expected saves: 27

Actual saves: 39

CLOSER+: 145

I'm was thinking about doing a bigger piece on Rivera  I'm fascinated by the guy's ability to get people out for a decade and more with, essentially, one pitch. Plus, I have this theory that I'm working on that Rivera has been even more valuable than his reputation, but for a very odd reason. My thinking is this: Because Rivera has been SO good, there have been very, very, very, very few back pages of the New York Post or New York Daily News that read like this:

Down The River-a: Yankees Blow Game In Ninth

or

BOMBERS BOMBED: Mariano falters late and Pinstripers Lose Again

See, we all know that nothing sucks the life out of a fan base more than the local heroes blowing a late lead. I don't know if it has a measurable effect on the team -- I haven't studied it -- but it definitely seems to have an effect on the general atmosphere, the energy level, the manager's enthusiasm, the talk radio tenor and so on. These things are multiplied in New York. And basically, in the case of Mariano, one guy has more or less eliminated that negativity from the equation.

I don't know ... just something I've been thinking about.

2. Brad Lidge, Phillies

Expected saves: 31

Actual saves: 41

CLOSER+: 132

I got the nicest call from Brad Lidge's grandmother the other day. In this crazy business, you get all sorts of phone calls, from people who hate your guts, to people who love you, to people want something you don't have (like free tickets or time with Tiger Woods). But then you get a nice call from Brad Lidge's grandmother, and it's just, you know, nice.

3. Jonathan Papelbon, Red Sox

Expected saves: 31

Actual saves: 41

CLOSER+: 129

The formula goes goes into fractions which is why Papelbon's expected and actual saves are the same as Lidge's but his CLOSER+ is a touch lower. At least I think that's the reason. Papelbon was 4 for 4 in tough saves, which is much better than Lidge (who was not given a tough save opportunity all year). But he was just 15 for 20 on regular saves (while Lidge, of course, did not blow a save opportunity all year long).