Lessons from ProElite's death

Gary Shaw (center) was intent on making EliteXC's fights favor the stand-up game. AP Josh Gross's Mailbag Submit a comment or question for Josh. Name: Email: Hometown: Question: SEND

Two years ago, as it unveiled itself at the posh Roosevelt Hotel in Hollywood, Calif., the group behind ProElite Inc. -- Doug DeLuca (a film and television producer) and Gary Shaw (a boxing promoter) -- heralded the company as a legitimate contender to the Ultimate Fighting Championship, buoyed by a broadcast deal and partnership with Showtime Networks.

"You may not believe in us today," said the bombastic Shaw. "But if you're smart, you will."

Somewhere out there, despite mounting evidence the business of mixed martial arts is tougher than a $3 steak, other wannabe promoters with deep pockets and a thirst to challenge the UFC will convince themselves they've got what it takes. With its newly minted EliteXC brand, ProElite fit that mold in December 2006. On the heels of the botched World Fighting Alliance, which signed several top fighters including Quinton Jackson and Ryoto Machida before flopping and selling its assets to the UFC, ProElite passed itself off as different.

It may have taken 17 events, but a quick postmortem reveals the people and philosophies behind ProElite and EliteXC were destined to fall short. Future promoters -- smart ones, at least -- may want to look at EliteXC, the International Fight League, Bodog Fight and the WFA for clues on what not to do.

Here, now, are the six most glaring things that led to the collapse of EliteXC.

1. Going public

Don't walk into MMA if you're going to rely upon public financing. It's simply too difficult to appaear viable as a company with your books open for scrutiny. The nature of the business lends itself to those who can adapt on the fly. Being public would seem to lessen that necessary flexibility.

Years after entrenching power as the top promoter in the sport, UFC executives shared stories of being $40 million in the hole and on the verge of giving up. What would have happened had quarterly filings revealed one ugly bottom line after another? It's entirely possible the business could not have survived. But as a private entity, the UFC was shielded from that kind of speculation. Like the IFL, ProElite was not.

2. Lack of commitment

Don't call yourself an elite MMA promoter if it's not the first thing you think about in the morning and the last thing you think about before going to bed.

There's no denying the passion that UFC President Dana White has brought to his company. When Lorenzo Fertitta decided he needed to spend more time focusing on the UFC, he stepped down from his position as a billion dollar casino mogul to do so. That drive was missing from ProElite, which did not feature a crew of MMA-first guys at the top. Shaw had his boxing business to fall back upon. DeLuca his various entertainment ventures, of which ProElite was clearly a part.

3. Using MMA as a sideshow

Others inside the company lived the sport, but they were on the fight side. The same could not be said, especially early on, of executives driving the ProElite ship.