The Year-After Effect

Beware of young pitchers whose workload increased in 2002

If Major League Baseball instituted the pitching police to safeguard young hurlers, its high-crime area would be Kansas City. What the Royals are doing to young pitchers deserves investigation.

Two years ago K.C. boasted Chris George, then only 21, and Chad Durbin, 23, as keys to a brighter future for the franchise. George had never worked more than 145 innings in any pro season. Durbin had never exceeded 159 innings. But in 2001, the Royals worked them way beyond those previous highs. George threw 191 1/3 innings and Durbin racked up 206 innings, jumps of 46 1/3 innings and 47 innings, respectively.

Regular readers of this column (you know who you are, both of you) are aware that for several years I've been tracking something I call the Year-After Effect. From talking to scouts and general managers over the years, I've found that the workload for young pitchers should gradually "staircase" as they mature -- that is, their innings pitched should increase in reasonable increments from year to year, especially when they first tackle the challenge of facing big league hitters. I decided to look at major league pitchers 25-and-under (with some exceptions for those who had turned 26) who had suddenly exceeded their previous pro high by 40 innings. (Rick Peterson, the learned pitching coach of the Oakland Athletics, told me recently he uses 30 innings as his danger point.)

It turned out that almost without exception pitchers who exceeded the 40-inning jump at a young age suffered a decrease in performance and a high degree of physical breakdown immediately after being pushed. George and Durbin were Year-After Effect victims. After throwing 397 1/3 innings in 2001, they combined for only 176 innings last year. Both landed on the disabled list. Neither won a game for K.C.

While George and Durbin were breaking down, the Royals were beating down their next promising young pitcher, Runelvys Hernandez, who turned 24 last April. Hernandez had never thrown more than 100 2/3 innings in a pro season. Kansas City, though, pushed him quickly through its system, eventually giving him 12 starts in the big leagues. The right-hander tossed a combined 192 2/3 innings last season -- a whopping 92-inning leap, the biggest for any young pitcher who appeared in the majors.

Look out Jeremy Affeldt, you're next. Affeldt, 23, has never thrown more than 147 1/3 innings in a pro season. He is a candidate to make the Royals rotation this spring. One can only wonder how many innings Kansas City will try to get out of the left-hander.

My intention is not to pick on the Royals. They are not alone in pushing young pitchers, though they have done it more recently than other organizations. Kansas City also pushed Mac Suzuki in 2001, giving him a borderline 30 2/3-inning jump over his previous pro high, but a risky 78 2/3-inning leap from the previous year. He's been hurt and ineffective ever since.

Before last season, using the Year-After Effect, I identified nine pitchers as being at high risk for a diminished season. All but one pitched to a worse ERA (the lone exception, C.C. Sabathia, improved by 0.02). All but one (Mark Buehrle) won fewer games. Six of the nine spent a portion of the season on the disabled list.

The Year-After Effect, for instance, caught up with Brad Penny, Joe Mays and Chris Carpenter last year, just as it did Kevin Millwood (2000), Matt Morris (1998) and many others in the past.

The Year-After Effect is based on a rule of thumb, not exact science. Body type, pitch counts, physical maturity, run support and other elements are important components of the growth and evaluation of young pitchers. But as a rule of thumb, the Year-After Effect should grab the attention of Kansas City and all organizations. Why? Over the previous three years I identified 16 pitchers as high risks. Of those 16 pitchers: