Are Their Days Numbered?

Work-load analysis isn't foolproof. Pitchers are quirky creatures who live and die on the strength of their talent and character. Many have overcome periods of overuse early in their careers, while others have faded despite light work before 25. House, who has had extensive experience working with young pitchers, puts Wright's hypothesis in perspective by emphasizing that such factors as mechanics and what he calls the pitcher's "conditioning base" can also affect longevity. As he writes in The Diamond Appraised, "Craig's research is certainly impressive. But that's what it is—research...."

With that caveat in mind, SI has used Wright's theory to analyze—in the charts on pages 48 and 63 and below—the careers of a number of prominent pitchers. We have also applied that theory—and some observations about the sometimes erratic course that won-lost records take after pitchers begin to go into decline—to project how five younger pitchers will fare for the remainder of their careers. The findings are a mixture of BFS and, well, ESP.

Roger Clemens. He had fairly heavy work loads at 23 and 24 (30.5 BFS in 1986 and 32.6 BFS in '87), and he may pay the price. However, Clemens, 26, has a perfect power pitcher's build (6'4", 220 pounds) and good mechanics, and he is a conditioning buff, all of which should help prolong his career. He will pitch until he's 37 or 38 and accumulate about 250 wins. His career will most likely parallel Palmer's: He will stay at the 20-victory level until about 29, win 15 to 17 games for another four or five years and wind up winning five to 10 games per season.

Dwight Gooden. Here's a good example of how being too good too soon can damage a pitcher. Gooden, 24, is on a 300-win pace, but he will likely wind up with about 230 victories. At 6'3", 198 pounds, he isn't bulky, and he's coming off his third 30-plus BFS season in four years. He has excellent mechanics and an explosive fastball, and is probably the best pitching talent of the 1980s, but he will have to struggle to come anywhere close to his previous success. Strange to say, his time in drug rehabilitation at the start of the '87 season could help him, because it gave him a much-needed break. Gooden will be a 20-game winner until about age 27 or 28, and then drop off to no more than 12 wins for the next two years. After that, he will work his way back up to 13 or so victories for two years before fading away at around 36.

Frank Viola. Five consecutive seasons of throwing more than 245 innings sounds like a lot of work, but Viola, 29, was a late bloomer who developed into the Minnesota Twins' workhorse. He was brought along slowly in college and had only one year of borderline overuse (257.2 innings pitched, 30.6 BFS in 1984) in his formative years. Viola will remain a 20-game winner for the next year or so and gradually decline in his 30's, until he calls it quits at around 37. With his 6'4", 209-pound frame, good conditioning and solid mechanics, Viola should age fairly well, but he probably won't end up with as many wins as Clemens because he has been winning at a slower pace throughout his career.

Fernando Valenzuela. Everyone knows Valenzuela's sad story. From 20 to 26, he averaged more than 250 innings per season for the Dodgers. During that span his BFS averaged out to 32.3. Valenzuela is already showing the consequences of that grind, and he's only 28. Over the last two years he has gone 19-22 with a 4.07 ERA, and last season he suffered a serious shoulder injury. Though he'll muster one 15-win season at around age 30 by adjusting to the limitations of pitching with a bad arm, Valenzuela will waver between eight and 10 wins per year for the rest of his career and fizzle out at 35. Two years ago Valenzuela was on a 300-win pace; now he will be lucky to break 200.

Bret Saberhagen. What happened to the Kansas City Royals' righthander is an absolute crime. At 23, in 1987, he had a 32.4 BFS with 257 innings pitched. Those numbers are way too high for a 6'1", 185-pound pitcher. Last year he continued to pour it on, racking up a 31.7 BFS and 260.2 innings. His career will follow about the same trajectory as Gooden's but with fewer wins. Saberhagen should win about 15 games per season until he's 28, when—it's ESP time—the Royals will squeeze a 20-win season out of him. His arm will never be the same again, and he'll peter out at around age 34 with 175 wins. However, if he's handled properly, Saberhagen could be an adequate pitcher for a while.

Even if you believe former pitcher Jim Bouton, who once said that statistics are about as interesting as first base coaches, the points Wright makes should not be ignored. The pressure on managers to win at all costs is creating a dangerous environment for young, promising pitchers. Take the long-suffering Atlanta Braves. Out of desperation they have rushed into service a gifted young pitching staff. The short-term benefits are apparent. As of Sunday, the Braves had won 18 games—two more than they had through the end of May last year—and were in third place in the National League West.

The long-term consequences are another matter. Although none of Atlanta's starters have faced heavy work loads so far, they may be headed for trouble. The average age of the five starters is 23.8, the bullpen is erratic, and the club is relying almost completely on pitching. No. 1 starter Tom Glavine, 23, has already thrown a league-leading four complete games, and John Smoltz, 22, 6-2, 2.51 ERA, has a 29.8 BFS. The temptation for manager Russ Nixon to stay with his talented young starters late into games will be great.

If you think it's impossible for an entire staff to collapse under the weight of being overused, consider that a decade ago the Oakland Athletics were floundering before climbing to a couple of winning seasons on the shoulders of a shining rotation made up of Mike Norris, Rick Langford, Matt Keough, Brian Kingman and Steve McCatty, all of whom were in their 20's. The Oakland staff threw 94 complete games in 1980, more than any staff since the Tigers in 1946. As one might expect, their BFS's were high; for example, Norris's was 34.8 and Langford's an astronomical 35.6. Within three years that Oakland rotation was in shreds, and by 1987 all five were out of baseball.